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Abstract: One approach that is gaining in popularity among portfolio managers uses 
ethical ratings, published by specialized research organizations, to screen securities 
for portfolio selection.  Portfolio managers can thus gain a better understanding of the 
phenomenon and adopt a better and more consistent approach to ethical investment.  
By the same token, board of directors can measure the impact of their ethical policies 
on the market performance of the stock of their company.  This paper provides new 
evidence about the impact of ethical ratings published in Canada on the risk-adjusted 
returns of the securities concerned, within the framework of a multi-factor Capital 
Asset Pricing Model, and gives an interpretation of the results from the perspective of 
portfolio composition and of corporate governance.   
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Résumé: La philosophie de l’investissement socialement responsable en valeurs 
mobilières s’est répandue à un rythme accéléré en Amérique du Nord au cours des 
dernières années.  La sélection des titres tient compte alors du comportement 
socialement responsable des entreprises, ce qui se fait de plus en plus à l’aide de 
critères de notation éthique.    En se basant sur la version multi-facteur du modèle 
d’évaluation des actifs financiers à l’équilibre, cette étude examine l’impact du 
nombre d’infractions éthiques sur le rendement des titres ainsi que l’impact du 
ciblage éthique sur la performance des portefeuilles.  Les résultats des tests 
empiriques sont interprétés dans une perspective de gestion de portefeuille et de 
gouvernance d’entreprise. 
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THE IMPACT OF ETHICAL RATINGS ON CANADIAN SECURITY 
PERFORMANCE:  PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
Ethical screening of securities for portfolio composition has received 
considerable attention in recent years, particularly from institutional investors and 
corporate managers.  The major preoccupation of investors, in this regard, is their 
ability to achieve the same or even a better risk/return tradeoff from portfolios 
estricted to securities of socially responsible companies as from portfolios 
without such constraints. For corporate managers, the question is whether ethical 
screening will affect the market evaluation of the securities of their companies.  
Either way, this new attention to the ethical behavior of companies can have an 
impact on business policies and practices particularly as regards the choice of 
operating procedures, products mix, sector diversification, and the relationship 
with stakeholders.  It can also have an impact on the extent to which investors 
may make ethical concerns a corporate governance issue in an effort to protect 
the value of their investment.  
 
Various approaches can be followed by investors in order to construct a universe 
of investment opportunities on an ethical basis.  One approach that is gaining in 
popularity among portfolio managers uses ethical ratings, published by 
specialized research organizations, to screen securities for portfolio selection.  
These ratings are usually built around a number of criteria pertaining to ethical 
behaviour and lines of business.  As more investors adopt this framework to 
define their universe of eligible securities, it becomes important to clarify the 
range of criteria included in these ratings, and to measure their impact on security 
risk-adjusted returns.  By analyzing the influence of these criteria, portfolio 
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managers can gain a better understanding of the phenomenon and adopt a better 
and more consistent approach to ethical investment.  By the same token, board of 
directors can measure the impact of their ethical policies on the market 
performance of the stock of their company.  As seen in this way, 
investorsperceptions of ethical business behaviour becomes a corporate 
governance issue. Ignoring ethical concerns may result in discount on the price of 
stock, as investors defect to firms that display higher ethical standards. While 
adopting strict ethical standards may increase operating costs, if they are priced 
by the market ignoring them could result in a loss of wealth to shareholders that 
may exceed those costs. This could result in ethical issues becoming a concern 
for corporate governance that may be impossible to ignore by firm managers and 
directors without penalty, since investors concerned about their wealth are likely 
to increase the pressure on directors to adopt sound ethical standards to forego 
discount by the market.  
 
So far, no study has addressed this issue in a market equilibrium framework.  To 
be sure, a number of event studies have examined the impact of specific ethical 
news or specific ethical policies on security returns.  For example, Gunthorpe 
(1997) examined whether the financial markets penalize public corporations at 
the announcement of unethical business behavior.  His study uses a sample of 
69US corporations that were involved in some form of alleged illegal activity 
over the period 1988-1992.  He uses the Market Model to estimate for each firm 
the average and cumulative average abnormal return five fays before and five 
days after the announcement of the alleged unethical event.  His results show that 
public announcements of unethical behavior carry a statistically significant 
penalty for stock prices of the firms concerned of about 1.3% over a day and 
2.3% over a week.  Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) also used the Market Model 
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approach and found a significant relationship between positive and negative 
environmental event announcements affecting companies and abnormal returns 
for their stocks.  Their study covers a sample of 96 publicly traded US firms for 
which a positive public announcement was made in regard to strong 
environmental performance, and 16 firms for which a negative public 
announcement was made thus signaling weak environmental performance over 
the period 1985-1991.   They report a positive cumulative average abnormal 
return of 0.82% following positive environmental events and a negative 
cumulative average abnormal return of 1.5% following negative environmental 
events.  In the same vein, Feldman, Soyka and Ameer (1997) using the CAPM 
methodology found that improving both the environmental management system 
and environmental performance can reduce firms’ perceived risk in the market 
place and increase their stock price by as much as 5%. 
 
Other studies have also examined the impact of ethical constraints from the 
perspective of portfolio performance.  Thus, Guerard (1997) compared the 
average monthly return of 950 stocks of companies designated as socially 
responsible with that of 1300 stocks of companies not having that designation for 
the period 1987-1994.  He also conducted a multifactor regression analysis of the 
total return of each stock on a number of accounting variables, on a quarterly 
basis, in order to rank stocks in terms of their expected returns, and form 
portfolios on this basis.  His results show that by and large no significant 
difference exists in average monthly returns between portfolios of socially 
screened and unscreened stocks.  He also shows that a composite model using 
both value and growth components produces no significant differences in stock 
selection modeling in screened and unscreened universes.  In the wake of the 
divestment movement of South African equities in the 1970’s, Rudd (1979) 
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looked at the impact of such exclusions on portfolio risk.  He began by excluding 
from the S&P 500 Index the 116 companies listed by the Investor Responsibility 
Research Center as having links with South Africa.  He then optimized the 
remaining securities to form a portfolio that matched the S&P 500 Index as 
closely as possible for September 1978.  His results show that this optimal 
portfolio although very well diversified with an R2 of .989 has an annual residual 
standard deviation of 2.21% in comparison to a residual standard deviation of 
zero for a pure index fund and 1.5% for a typical marketed index fund.   In the 
same vein, Wagner, Emkin and Dixon (1984) examined the possibility of 
replacing 152 companies of the S&P 500 index operating in South Africa with 
the largest “unrestricted” companies of their respective industries and compared 
this modified portfolio with the original index from the first quarter of 1979 to 
the first quarter of 1984.  They concluded that the modified portfolio, although 
very well diversified (R2 of 0.968) is riskier than the index (Beta of 1.08) and 
entails additional costs of research, trading and administration.  Kahn, Lekander 
and Leimkuhler (1997) examined the investment implications of a forced 
divestiture of the tobacco holdings of pension funds for passive as well as for 
active managers.  By using the S&P 500 as benchmark for passive fund 
managers, the study shows that removing tobacco stocks from the index reduces 
its performance by 21 basis points per year, over the period 1987-1996, with a 
negligible effect on risk.  As for active managers, the study indicates that the 
tobacco divestiture decision reduces their potential for outperformance by 
reducing the number of stocks in the opportunity set, and creates measurement 
problems associated with imperfect benchmarks.  The study also shows that a 
strategy of optimally weighting the tobacco-free portfolio to match the beta and 
other risk characteristics of the S&P 500 as closely as possible, would result in 
higher transaction costs due to higher turnover.   On the other hand, Diltz (1995) 
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looked at the impact of various ethical screens on portfolio performance for the 
period 1989-1991 and concluded that eleven ethical screens and combinations of 
them had no significant effect on performance.  He also found that the good 
environmental behavior screen and the nuclear and military exclusion screen had 
positive impact on performance, whereas the provision of family-related benefits 
screen had a negative impact.    
 
Attempts were also made to study the relationship between ethical behavior and 
financial performance at the company level.  Thus, Waddock and Graves (2000) 
find that companies that successfully pass a social screen and those that don’t 
perform about the same financially.  Verschoor and Murphy (2002), on the other 
hand, report that the 100 companies included in the S&P 500 index which 
qualified for the “Business Ethics Best Citizen” title awarded by Business Week 
in 2001 ranked higher by ten percentile points on average than the mean ranking 
of the remaining companies in this index in terms of overall financial 
performance as measured by Business Week on the basis of eight financial ratios.  
A range of studies, such as those by Hart and Ahuja (1996) and Russo and Fouts 
(1997) draw on the resource-based theory of the firm to evaluate the impact of 
environmental policies and show that environmental performance and economic 
performance are positively linked1. In all cases, the results suggest a positive 
association between ethical behavior and profitability although it should be noted 
that causality has not been demonstrated by these tests.   
 
In this paper we provide new evidence about the impact of ethical ratings 
published in Canada on the risk-adjusted returns of the securities concerned, 
within the framework of a multi-factor Capital Asset Pricing Model, and give an 
interpretation of the results from the perspective of portfolio composition and that 
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of corporate governance.  The next section describes the data set and presents the 
methodology used.  The third section discusses the statistical estimation 
procedures used in the tests and gives the empirical results and their 
interpretation.  The fourth section concludes the paper. 
 
Data and methodology 
 
The initial sample in this study includes 448 Canadian companies over the period 
1997-2000.  Ethical scoring of these companies come from the Canadian Social 
Investment Database (CSID) and reflects the ratings given to each company in 
regard to qualitative as well as exclusionary screens.  The first category of 
screens encompasses seven criteria pertaining to community, diversity, employee 
relations, environment, international operations, product and practices 
considerations, and corporate governance.  Each of these criteria is sub-divided 
into a number of sub-criteria2 for which a standard of ethical conduct is defined.  
The sub-criteria that are associated with positive ethical business conduct result 
in strength scores, while the sub-criteria associated with unethical behavior result 
in concern scores.  Each individual score takes the value of 0 or 1 depending 
upon whether the standard of the relevant sub-criterion is met or not.  The second 
category of screens includes five criteria pertaining to activities related to 
alcohol, gambling, tobacco, military contracting and nuclear power.   Each of 
these five criteria is sub-divided into two sub-criteria only, reflecting either a 
minor involvement (with a score of 1) or a major involvement (with a score of 2) 
in each one of these lines of businesses. 
 
Ratings are assigned to companies with respect to the qualitative screens, in 
terms of strengths and concerns scores assigned on the basis of whether or not the 
 9
companies meet the standard of each strength and concern sub-criterion defined 
for each criterion.  As for exclusionary screens, their ratings are only in terms of 
major or minor concerns, since they are intended to screen out companies 
engaged in specific lines of businesses.  Company ratings are updated by groups 
of companies every quarter, in order to have the whole sample reviewed over the 
course of each year.   
 
Monthly stock returns come from the TSE-Western tape (CFMRC) and 
accounting information is collected from the Stockguide tape. 
 
The first part of our analysis seeks to estimate stock performance relative to 
ethical scores of strengths, concerns and exclusions in order to establish the 
relative impact of the criteria responsible for these scores on returns.  Following 
Fama and French (1993), we estimate stock performance relative to the criteria in 
ethical ratings using the following model: 
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where: 
(Rit - RFt) is the difference between the return on stock i and the return on a 90       
day Canadian Treasury Bill for each year t; 
(RMt-RFt)  is the difference between the return on the Toronto Stock Exchange 
300 Index (capped)3 and that on a 90 day Canadian Treasury Bill for 
year t; 
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(St - Bt)  is the difference between the return on a portfolio of small capitalization 
stocks and that on a portfolio of large capitalization stocks for year t; 
(Ht - Lt)  is the difference between the return on a portfolio of stocks with a high 
ratio of Book Value / Market Value and that of a portfolio of stocks 
with a low such ratio for year t; 
Sjit        are the strength scores for the various sub-criteria (j) reported for stock i 
in year t with respect to the criteria of the qualitative screens; 
Chit      are the concern scores for the various sub-criteria (h) reported for stock i 
in year t with respect to the criteria of the qualitative screens;   
Ekit       are the scores for the various sub-criteria (k) reported for stock i in year t 
with respect to the exclusionary screens; 
Within the limits of the data available, the risk factors (St - Bt) and (Ht - Lt) were 
estimated from six different portfolios comprising 380 stocks in 1997, 377 stocks 
in 1998, 374 stocks in 1999 and 387 stocks in 2000.  The six portfolios were 
organized as in Fama and French (1993) with three portfolios of small 
capitalization stocks having a high (SH) an average (SM) and a low (SL) ratio of 
Book Value/Market Value, and three other portfolios  of large capitalization 
stocks with a high (BH) an average (BM) and a low (BL) ratio of Book Value / 
Market Value.  The factor (St - Bt) represents the difference between the 
aggregate return of SH, SM and SL portfolios and that of BH, BM and BL 
portfolios for each month t, whereas the factor (Ht - Lt) represents the difference 
between the aggregate return of BH and SH portfolios and that of BL and SL 
portfolios.  The correlation coefficient between these two factors for the period 
under study is –0.0225 which indicates their orthogonality. 
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It is also interesting, in this regard, to examine the impact of the total number of 
strengths, concerns and/or exclusions pertaining to each stock on its performance.  
To perform this test a modified version of model (1-a) is used as follows: 
 
 )-(   )-(   )-(       - 3it2it1it ttttFtMtFtit LHBSRRRR βββα +++=  
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where the SSit, CCit and EEit are the total number of strengths, concerns and 
exclusions scores affecting stock i in year t. 
 
The second part of our analysis seeks to determine the total number of concern 
scores beyond which portfolio performance is adversely affected.  The analysis is 
limited to the number of concerns as they represent the decision variable in 
portfolio composition that determines the degree to which a portfolio of non-
excluded stocks can be ethical without sacrificing performance4.  In this regard, 
portfolio performance is estimated using the following model: 
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where:   
Rit – Rft is the difference between the return of portfolio i and that of a 90 Day 
Canadian Treasury Bill for each month t.  The other risk factors are as 
defined before, except that they are calculated on a monthly basis. 
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Four different portfolios were composed for this test with stocks exhibiting either 
zero, one, two or three concerns.  The dummy variables D1, D2 and D3 take on the 
value of 0 or 1 with respect to these portfolios as follows: 
 D1 D2 D3 
Portfolio of stocks with a 
score of zero concerns 
      
      0 
 
0 
 
0 
Portfolio of stocks with a 
score of one concern 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
Portfolio of stocks with a 
score of two concerns 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
Portfolio of stocks with a 
score of three and more 
concerns 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
The four portfolios in this test are equally weighted, and are rebalanced on a 
yearly basis in order to keep their basic features5 constant. 
   
Before testing, the data set was rearranged to accommodate each of the models to 
be estimated. For Model (1-a) the data set includes all the 448 companies for 
which complete ratings are available.  To estimate this model, annual 
observations of excess returns, the three risk factors and the annual scores with 
respect to strengths (Sjit), concerns (Chit) and exclusions (Ekit) are attributed to 
each company.  For model (1-b) a second very similar data set was created with 
returns and the risk factors still calculated on a yearly basis, but with strengths, 
concerns and exclusions scores aggregated for each company in each year.  To 
estimate model (2), a data base was constituted with monthly observations of 
returns and risk factors, and with a binary variable D1 to D3 attached to each 
portfolio.  The portfolio with zero concerns (D0) represents the intercept.  As a 
result of this data organization, we end up with all data sets in panel format. For 
Models (1-a) and (1-b), the data set has i=1,…,448 “individuals”  and t=1,…,4 
giving a total of 1792 observations. However, due to the fact that the rating 
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agency has expanded its sample gradually over the period under study, we end up 
with a total of 1420 usable observations. For Model (2), the data set consists of 
i=1,…,4 and t=1,…,48, giving a total of 192 observations.  
 
It should be mentioned that the relatively small number of monthly observations 
and the fact that the data takes a panel format precludes the use of GARCH 
procedures. Instead, we will control for heteroskedasticiy by other means suitable 
for panel data. 
  
Empirical Results 
 
Summary statistics of the data used in models (1-a) and (1-b) are presented in 
Table 1.  The table reveals, among other things, the high variability of returns of 
individual stocks (expressed in decimals), compared to that of the market.  As 
regards ratings, it is interesting to note first that the maximum observed strength 
scores vis-à-vis a criterion is 4, implying that for this particular criterion 
(diversity) a company has exhibited strength on four related sub-criteria.  The 
maximum cumulative strength scores obtained by a company with respect to all 
criteria in this category of screens is 10.  As regards concerns, the maximum 
observed scores obtained for a criterion is 2 and the maximum total obtained by a 
company with respect to all criteria combined in this category of screens is 6.  In 
the case of exclusions, the maximum number of concern scores obtained for each 
sub-criterion is of course 2, signifying a major concern, and the maximum total 
of all scores in regard of this category of screens is 3. 
 
Given the panel nature of the data, a number of precautions must be taken in the 
estimation procedure.  More specifically, OLS can be a suitable estimation 
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approach only under very specific conditions that are rarely found with this type 
of data.   Thus, with respect to models (1-a and 1-b), we proceeded first by 
estimating the models by means of OLS to recover the residuals.  These residuals 
were then subjected to an ANOVA that evaluates the potential presence of 
individual (firm) effects and time effects. The presence of one or both of these 
effects could bias the covariance matrix of parameter estimates. This would be 
the case if unobservable individual effects, or if time effects are correlated to the 
explicitly stated variables (risk or rating), that is if either E[x|µi]≠0 or E[x|τt]≠0, 
where µi and τt are individual or time unobservable effects respectively. The 
presence of individual effects would mean that specific firms returns for all 
periods may be explained by factors other than the risk factors and the scores. On 
the other hand, the presence of time effects would mean that there are time-
varying macro factors not accounted for explicitly by the risk factors and the 
rating scores that explain variations of returns of all firms. The ANOVA on the 
residuals would provide information on whether such effects are present in the 
data or not. 
 
The presence of either or both of the above mentioned effects requires an 
adaptation of the estimation methodology. Assuming the absence of endogeneity 
(e.g. that past return influences future rating) we can choose between two 
relatively straightforward procedures: estimation via “fixed effects” (FE) or 
estimation via “random effects” (RE). The choice of the appropriate procedure 
can be decided upon by a Hausman specification test, in which the vectors of 
coefficients estimated by both procedures are compared.6  If the equality of 
vectors coefficients is rejected, it would be a clear indication that the RE 
estimation procedure, while more efficient, yields biased parameters.  In this 
instance, the use of an FE based estimation procedure becomes mandatory.  
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However, if the equality of vector coefficients is not rejected, it would suggest 
that either procedure will generate unbiased estimates, but RE would provide in 
this case, more efficient estimates of the covariance matrix.  Once we have 
established the right estimation procedure, we go on to present the results of the 
tests, using either the FE or the RE procedure, and to perform a Wald test of 
exclusion on the variables of interest. 
 
Given the somewhat different nature of the dataset used to estimate Model 2, we 
will be forced to introduce some variations to the above procedure that will be 
explained later in the paper. 
 
Table 2 shows the results of the ANOVA for the residuals of Model (1-a) 
estimated by OLS.  
 
The F-statistics obtained in the ANOVA suggest that we need to take into 
consideration the existence of both individual and time effects. In a more 
economic sense, this test implies that the variations of returns are not fully 
accounted for by the variables explicitly included in the model. 
 
When we perform the Hausman test that compares vectors coefficients obtained 
with the FE and RE procedures, the Chi-Square stands at 228.127 with a 
significance level of 0.0000, suggesting the inequality of coefficients obtained 
with both procedures. Estimation by FE thus becomes mandatory. The result of 
estimating Model (1-a) by FE are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 reveals the near absence of any significant coefficient. The only 
exception is the coefficient for S7 (the corporate governance strength criterion) 
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with a significance level of 2.5% and the right sign. While corporate governance 
strength is no doubt an important factor that may cause this result, its high 
significance may also be due to a type II error.  The coefficients of the risk 
factors are also non-significant, and all Chi Square values for the Wald joint 
exclusion test for groups of coefficients (all Ss, Cs, and Es respectively) are quite 
small and non-significant.  This suggests that individually taken, almost no single 
rating score, be it a strength, a concern or an exclusion, appears to affect stock 
returns.  In other words, investors appear to be reasonably tolerant in regard to 
individual scores of ethical issues, and do not seem to penalize or reward stocks 
for one or the other of these scores.  The fact that the Wald test of joint exclusion 
is non-significant does not contradict this conclusion since this test does not 
measure a cumulative effect. 
 
With respect to Model (1-b), the ANOVA for the residuals estimated by OLS 
yield the results shown in Table 4. 
 
This ANOVA suggests that in the case of this series there is no time nor 
individual effects that may invalidate the OLS estimates. In other words, 
estimation by FE or RE should yield consistent results with those of OLS.  The 
results of estimating Model (1-b) by OLS are reported in Table 5. 
 
In this regression, as in that for Model (1-a), no particular risk factor or aggregate 
rating score stands out as significant in explaining stock returns. The only 
significant exception is the coefficient related to aggregate concerns, which has a 
level of significance of 4% and the expected sign.  This means that when strength 
scores, concern scores and exclusion scores are aggregated separately for each 
company and regressed on stock returns, the only significant variable that shows 
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in the results turns out to be total concerns, and its impact on returns is, as 
expected, negative.  Thus, even though investors appear to be indifferent to the 
nature of individual concerns, strength or exclusions, they seem to pay attention 
to the level of aggregate ethical concerns.  We will have the opportunity to 
validate these results with those obtained from Model (2) below.   It is also 
interesting to mention, in this regard, that estimations by RE yield exactly the 
same results as those obtained by OLS.  
 
Turning now to Model (2), we present in Table 6 some summary statistics about 
the data.   The table is organized in terms of portfolios with the number of 
concerns increasing from one to three or more.  
 
In estimating Model (2) we are implicitly using an FE approach where individual 
effects are controlled thru the dummies (see Hsiao (1986)).  However, this 
estimation procedure does not control for potential unobservable time effects.  
While risk factors should account for most time variations that affect all 
individuals, there is no guarantee that this, in fact, is the case. 7 Ignoring other 
non-observable time effects could thus bias coefficients, since we would be 
assuming that E[x|τt] = 0 when this is not the case.  
 
To test whether residual time effects are present despite the use of the risk factors 
we estimate Model (2) using an OLS regression and then perform an ANOVA on 
the residuals in order to test whether unaccounted time effects are still present. 
The results of the ANOVA are shown in Table 7. 
 
We have, of course, ignored individual effects in estimating the ANOVA because 
these have already been eliminated thru the dummies. The F-statistic suggests 
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unambiguously the presence of time effects not accounted for by the risk factors. 
The t-statistics obtained from the OLS estimates may thus be biased8.  To correct 
for this bias we must use an adapted estimation procedure.  Assuming the 
absence of endogeneity, the two procedures used for Models (1-a) and (1-b) can 
also be applied here, namely the estimation by FE with correction for time effects 
and the estimation by RE also with correction for time effects.  However, as 
noted before when discussing the estimation procedure for Models (1-a) and     
(1-b), the choice of the appropriate procedure depends upon the outcome of the 
Hausman test. When this test is performed for Model (2) we obtain a trivially 
small value of 3.44x10-28, which is obviously non-significant. This result is not 
surprising considering the fact that in this dataset, in contrast to the one used to 
estimate Models (1-a) and (1-b), the value of T=48 is much larger than that of 
N=4.  This means that the RE estimation procedure is the correct one.  Table 8 
presents the results of the estimation of Model (2) using RE. 
 
Several important observations can be made from this table.  In the first place, as 
the relatively high value of the adjusted R2 shows, over 70% of the total variation 
in returns is explained by the model.  Secondly, despite the fact that the risk 
factors and the concerns scores do not account for all the variations in returns, 
they are all highly significant.  Most importantly, the number of concerns seems 
to affect returns in an increasing fashion.  To start with, the portfolio with zero 
concerns (portfolio D0) earns no abnormal return; its Jensen’s alpha is not 
different from zero. However, the three other portfolios which have increasing 
number of concerns are penalized quite heavily, roughly in proportion to the level 
of concerns.   Thus, the portfolio with stocks exhibiting one concern yields a 
return that is lower than that of the portfolio with zero concerns by 1.3% per 
month, at a confidence level of 8%.   The portfolio of stocks with two concerns 
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yields a monthly return lower by 1.2% at a confidence level of 12%, than that of 
the portfolio with zero concerns.  Finally, the portfolio with three and more 
concerns yields a full 2.0% per month less than the portfolio with zero concerns, 
at the 1% confidence level9.  Furthermore, when we perform a Wald test of 
exclusion on the three dummies, we obtain a Chi-Square of 7.466 with a 
significance level of 0.0584.  It should be remembered, in this regard, that the 
average monthly return of the market during the period under study was 1.33% 
with a standard deviation of 5.39%.  It should also be noted that the correct 
interpretation of the coefficients for the dummies implies that the losses are not 
cumulative.  It is also interesting to note that when model (2) is estimated with an 
FE procedure, the coefficients obtained are numerically similar to those in table 8 
but at much lower significance levels. 
 
The above results are consistent with those obtained from Model (1-b) where we 
observed that investors appear to pay attention to aggregate concerns rather than 
to the presence of a particular concern.  In other words, investors do not seem to 
follow a simplistic yes/no exclusion screen in defining their universe of eligible 
securities.  Rather, their decision process reflects personal choices regarding the 
level of ethical behaviour they wish to express in their portfolios.  Their basic 
concern, therefore, does not lie with strength or exclusion scores, but with the 
overall level of concerns afflicting each company.  More importantly, for the 
period under study, the portfolio of stocks with zero concerns outperformed the 
portfolios of stocks with either one, two or three or more concerns.  This last 
observation can be of significance in the debate regarding the impact of ethical 
screens on portfolio performance. 
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The results obtained through the estimation of both models are thus consistent. 
On one hand, investors that ignore ethical concerns are likely to obtain 
statistically significant and sizable lower returns on their portfolios. On the other 
hand, company directors who ignore ethical issues in their decision making 
process are likely to inflict losses on their shareholders’ wealth.  The financial 
viability of ethical screening of securities, illustrated in the findings of this paper, 
also suggest that the issue of ethical rating is not likely to go away soon.  In a 
market with these characteristics, corporations should pay attention to the level of 
aggregate ethical concerns that is signalled to the market concerning their 
activities and to continually clarify their ethical policies and practices to 
investors.    
 
Conclusion 
Increasingly, investors are stressing the importance of the ethical posture of 
corporations in choosing their universe of investment opportunities.  The strategy 
that is gaining momentum in this regard is to screen stocks on the basis of ethical 
ratings published by specialized research organisations.  These ratings relate to 
various aspects of the business behaviour of corporations as observed and 
evaluated by the research organisation with respect to an accepted standard. 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the market response to the ethical 
business behaviour of Canadian publicly traded corporations, as signalled to the 
public thru ratings of ethical strengths concerns and exclusions.  By examining 
whether or not stock returns are rewarded for positive ethical practices and 
policies and/or penalized for the negative ones, insight might be gained into two 
related questions, namely: 
(1) should ethical screening scores be considered in portfolio composition, and  
(2) is there a financial incentive to incorporate ethics into business culture and 
decision making. 
 
The findings of this research clearly show that investors react only to the level of 
concern scores signalled to them by the scoring agency, without regard to the 
particular aspect of unethical behaviour covered by each concern.  The analysis 
also shows that a portfolio of stocks with zero concerns outperforms portfolios 
comprising securities with one, two and three or more concerns.  Furthermore, 
there is a significant decline in portfolio risk-adjusted returns as exposure to the 
number of concerns increases. 
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From the investor point of view, our research indicates that there is good reason 
for relying on the number of concern scores in screening securities for portfolio 
composition.  The viability of this strategy in terms of portfolio performance 
indicates that such ethical screening is not about to go away soon.   
 
From the point of view of corporate governance, the findings of this paper 
suggest that ignoring ethical concerns triggers a negative reaction from investors, 
as they defect to firms that display higher ethical standards.  Thus, although the 
implementation of strict ethical standards can undoubtedly increase operating 
costs for corporations, ignoring them could result in considerable loss of wealth 
to shareholders that may well exceed those costs. These findings also suggest that 
ethical issues may become in the future a major consideration in corporate 
governance that cannot simply be overlooked by corporate directors without 
considerable penalty to the market value of their companies.  Indeed, if the trend 
identified in this research persists, investors are likely to increase the pressure on 
directors for the implementation of sound ethical standards and practices in order 
to avoid the market penalties. Alternatively, corporate raiders may be able to 
extract rent by acquiring undervalued firms and devising ethical standards and 
policies for them.  Corporations should therefore be proactive as regards the level 
of ethical concerns they wish to signal to the market, and to conduct their 
business policy accordingly. 
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FOOTNOTES 
 
                                                 
1 Russo and Fouts also show that returns to environmental performance are higher in high- 
growth industries.  Their tests cover a sample of 243 firms over a period of two years. 
 
2 For the community criterion five strength and four concern sub-criteria are defined, while for 
the diversity criterion, six strength and three concern sub-criteria are enumerated.  Employee 
relations criterion comprises six strength and five concern sub-criteria, whereas the environment 
criterion comprises six strength and eight concern sub-criteria.  The international criterion 
encompasses five strength and seven concern sub-criteria, while product and practices criterion 
has three strength and five concern sub-criteria.  Finally, the last criterion, identified as corporate 
governance, is made up of four strength and four concern sub-criteria 
 
3 This version of the Index imposes a limit of 10% on the weight of any security’s market value. 
 
4 By definition, exclusion criteria are of a binary nature and affect a relatively small number of 
stocks.   
 
5 The portfolio of stocks with zero concerns is made up of 29 securities in 1997, 31 securities in 
1998, 38 securities in 1999 and 46 securities in 2000.  The portfolio of stocks with one concern is 
made up of 55 securities in 1997, 55 securities in 1998, 56 securities in 1999 and 60 securities 
in2000.  The portfolio of stocks with two concerns includes 49 securities in 1997, 50 securities in 
1998, 49 securities in 1999 and 41 securities in 2000.  Finally, the portfolio of stocks with three 
concerns is made up of 24 securities in 1997, 23 securities in 1998, 19 securities in 1999 and 17 
securities in 2000.   
Although the focus of this test is on the number of concerns scores, it is worth mentioning that the 
distribution of strength scores within each of the four portfolios over the period under study is 
almost similar.   
 
6 The Hausman specification test is typically applied when two estimation procedures may be 
used, one efficient but potentially biased and the other unbiased but inefficient. In our case RE is 
efficient but potentially biased, while FE is unbiased but inefficient. The Hausman test consists of 
computing the difference of the vector of coefficients and comparing it against the covariance 
matrix of the coefficients. The statistic is distributed Chi-squared. See Hasuman (1978).  
 
7 Indeed, the Fama and French factors may explain a considerable portion of this time variation. 
However other time related sources of variation may exist that are not proxied by these factors.  
One simple example would be the technology stock crash that could have and across-the-board 
impact on the market around certain dates.  One simple way to control for unaccounted time 
variation would be to introduce time dummy variables. These dummies would the capture the 
unexplained time variation. But this is an inefficient approach.  
 
8 We can only speculate about the source of this additional variation in the data. 
 
9 It is interesting to note that using an index of all securities listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange 
instead of the TSE 300 Index (capped) in this regression does not yield significantly different 
results. 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics for Stocks and Ratings (annual data) 
Series  Mean Std Error Minimum Maximum 
RI - RF 0.2656 2.4500 -1.0302 62.3798 
RM - RF 0.0769 0.2403 -0.2148 0.4246 
SMALL - BIG -0.2397 0.2045 -0.3788 0.1132 
HIGH - LOW -0.1921 0.4297 -0.8876 0.2303 
S1: Community 0.2736 0.5117 0 2 
S2: Diversity 0.3325 0.6194 0 4 
S3: Employee relation 0.6109 0.7392 0 3 
S4: Environment 0.1961 0.4664 0 2 
S5: International operations 0.0185 0.1350 0 1 
S6: Product & business practices 0.1856 0.4150 0 2 
S7: Corporate governance 0.1937 0.4453 0 2 
SS Total 1.2536 1.7180 0 10 
C1: Community 0.0153 0.1229 0 1 
C2: Diversity 0.3179 0.4676 0 2 
C3: Employee relation 0.0742 0.2683 0 2 
C4: Environment 0.2510 0.5216 0 2 
C5: International operations 0.0451 0.2154 0 2 
C6: Product & business practices     0.0532 0.2386 0 2 
C7: Corporate governance 0.5504 0.6497 0 3 
CC Total 0.9050 1.1199 0 6 
E1: Alcohol 0.0161 0.1790 0 2 
E2: Gambling 0.0080 0.1060 0 2 
E3: Tobacco 0.0129 0.1551 0 2 
E4: Military contracting 0.0548 0.2902 0 2 
E5: Nuclear power 0.0347 0.2039 0 2 
EE Total 0.8771 0.3894  0 3 
 
 
 
Table 2 
ANOVA for OLS residuals of Model (1-a) 
Source Sum of Squares DF Mean Square F-Statistic Signif Level 
INDIV 2690.161 405  6.6423 3.598 0.0000 
TIME 21.9439 3 7.3146 3.9622 0.0081 
JOINT 2690.161 408 6.5935 3.5716 0.0000 
ERROR 1336.584 724 1.8461   
TOTAL 4026.745 1132    
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Table 3 
Estimation of Model (1-a) Using a Fixed Effect Approach 
Variable Coeff Std Error T-Stat Signif 
Constant 1.8140 16207.3442 0.0001 0.9999 
β1 -0.9442 16919.5780 -0.0001 1.0000 
β2 4.3851 48817.2302 0.0001 0.9999 
β3 1.5662 19208.5380 0.0001 0.9999 
S1 -0.1354 0.1976 -0.6853 0.4934 
S2 -0.0096 0.1724 -0.0559 0.9555 
S3 0.0157 0.1347 0.1167 0.9071 
S4 -0.2175 0.2330 -0.9335 0.3509 
S5 -0.0258 0.8552 -0.0302 0.9759 
S6 0.0728 0.2729 0.2668 0.7897 
S7 0.6267 0.2798 2.2401 0.0254 
C1 -0.1634 0.5090 -0.3211 0.7482 
C2 -0.1429 0.2183 -0.6545 0.5131 
C3 -0.1068 0.3615 -0.2954 0.7678 
C4 0.1208 0.2426 0.4979 0.6187 
C5 0.2725 0.4882 0.5581 0.5769 
C6 0.1073 0.3818 0.2810 0.7788 
C7 -0.2214 0.1545 -1.4334 0.1522 
E1 -0.1092 1584.1356 -0.0001 0.9999 
E2 -0.0781 0.7762 -0.1007 0.9199 
E3 -0.2265 1494.9771 -0.0002 0.9999 
E4 -0.1078 0.7165 -0.1505 0.8805 
E5 0.1563 0.8235 0.1898 0.8495 
                 Adjusted R2 = 0.449        F=2.9505         0.0000  N=448; T=4 
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Table 4 
ANOVA for OLS residuals of Model (1-b) 
Source Sum of Squares DF Mean Square F-Statistic Signif Level 
INDIV 2009.711 406 4.95002928 0.7829 0.998008 
TIME 0.57949 3 0.1931663 0.0306 0.9928151 
JOINT 2009.711 409 4.913721 0.7772 0.9985254 
ERROR 6392.277 1011 6.32272794  
TOTAL 8401.98983 1420  
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Estimation of Model (1-b) Using OLS 
Variable Coeff Std Error T-Stat Signif 
Constant 1.0139 0.4860 2.0860 0.0372 
β1 0.4996 0.4966 1.0059 0.3146 
β2 1.9758 1.4268 1.3847 0.1664 
β3 0.7627 0.5598 1.3623 0.1733 
ω -0.0243 0.0388 -0.6265 0.5311 
χ -0.1249 0.0608 -2.0543 0.0401 
ν -0.0297 0.1570 -0.1889 0.8502 
                   Adjusted     R2 = 0.01   DW=2.056            F=3.4230            N=448; T=4 
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Table 6 
       Summary Statistics for Portfolios exhibiting one, two or three 
 and more concerns 
 (monthly data) 
Series Mean Std Error Minimum Maximum 
Fi RR   -  0.0072 0.0676 -0.2349 0.2080 
FM RR -  0.0065 0.0714 -0.2139 0.2363 
BS-  -0.0214 0.0395 -0.1113 0.0904 
LH-  -0.0016 0.0571 -0.2079 0.1184 
  
 
 
Table 7 
Analysis of Variance for the residuals of OLS estimate of Model (2) 
Source Sum of 
Squares  
DF Mean Square  F-Statistic  Signif Level
TIME 47.0 47 0 .00333 2.3277 0.0000699
ERROR 0.2061678 144 0 .00143  
TOTAL 0.3628001 191.0  
 
 
 
Table 8 
Estimation of Model (2) using RE and controlling for time effects 
Variable Coeff Std Error T-Stat Signif 
Constant 0.00002 0.00689 0.0028 0.9977 
β1 0.93838 0.07665 12.241 0.0000 
β2 -0.63430 0.11987 -5.2913 0.0000 
β3 0.62211 0.08704 -7.1473 0.0000 
ϖ1 -0.01338 0.00772 -1.7327 0.0831 
ϖ2 -0.01200 0.00772 -1.5537 0.1202 
ϖ3 -0.02080 0.00772 -2.6941 0.0070 
                   Adjusted R2=0.722  N=4; T=48 
 
 
